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Theories of Meaning and Reference and the Scientific Realism/Anti-Realism Debate

Fathi, Ako | 2025

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  1. Type of Document: M.Sc. Thesis
  2. Language: Farsi
  3. Document No: 58611 (42)
  4. University: Sharif University of Technology
  5. Department: Philosophy of Science
  6. Advisor(s): Akbari Takhtameshlou, Javad
  7. Abstract:
  8. This study re-examines the debate between scientific realism and anti-realism by exploring its connection to theories of meaning and reference. Initially, by distinguishing between the metaphysical and epistemological commitments of each side, we demonstrate that scientific realism is not merely an extension of common-sense understanding, but a position supported by profound philosophical arguments. Concurrently, the most significant anti-realist challenges _ranging from incommensurability and pessimistic meta-induction to the restriction of knowledge to the observable domain _are presented and evaluated. Subsequently, to elucidate the semantic backdrop of the debate, a critical overview of twentieth-century theories of meaning and reference is provided. Focusing on the descriptivist theory of meaning, we show how this conception of meaning_ as a set of descriptions _serves as a source for anti-realist arguments concerning meaning change, reference failure, and the consequent pervasive falsity of theoretical terms. The realist response is formulated by drawing on Kripke's and Putnam's theory of direct reference: proper names and general terms, particularly natural kind terms, do not refer via descriptions, but rather refer directly and rigidly to their referents across all possible worlds. This framework, combined with an essentialist turn and realist revisions to the descriptivist theory, provides the tools to explain the continuity of reference amidst theoretical and semantic shifts, thereby weakening anti-realist arguments. Nevertheless, we will demonstrate that these solutions rest on metaphysical presuppositions, and that some of the hidden assumptions within the arguments for direct reference cast doubt on their validity. Drawing inspiration from Kripke's reading of Wittgenstein's rule-following problem, we address a more fundamental challenge to direct reference and, by extension, to scientific realism as a whole
  9. Keywords:
  10. Meaning Theory ; Reference Theory ; Scientific Realism ; Scientific Anti-Realism ; Scientific Essentialism ; Natural Kinds ; Rigid Designation ; Rule-Following

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