Van Fraassen, Structuralism and Newman's Objection

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Nakhaee Kooshe, Ali | 2025

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Type of Document: M.Sc. Thesis
Language: Farsi
Document No: 58388 (42)
University: Sharif University of Technology
Department: Philosophy of Science
Advisor(s): Akbari Takhtameshlou, Javad
Abstract:
In the philosophical debate between scientific realism and anti-realism, some philosophers have proposed a third path, known as structural realism. According to this view, the only real part of scientific theories is their structural aspect. Structural realism, however, has faced Newman's objection from the beginning, which poses a serious challenge to the position: one cannot endorse structural realism while remaining indifferent to Newman’s critique. Van Fraassen, an empiricist and prominent defender of anti-realism, has presented his version of structuralism, rooted in his anti-realist stance. Van Fraassen claims that this version of structuralism can withstand Newman's objection. In this thesis, I argue that van Fraassen's structuralist view, grounded in his empiricism, is in fact not subject to Newman's objection at all. My claim is that empiricist structuralism was never the intended target of Newman's critique from the beginning
Keywords:
Van Fraassen ; Constructive Empiricism ; Structural Realism ; Newman's Criticism ; Empirical Structuralism

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