Loading...

Value-Laden Science from the Perspectives of Longino and Bhaskar: A Critical Reflection on the Idea of Religious Science

Qaemi, Ali | 2024

167 Viewed
  1. Type of Document: M.Sc. Thesis
  2. Language: Farsi
  3. Document No: 57436 (42)
  4. University: Sharif University of Technology
  5. Department: Philosophy of Science
  6. Advisor(s): Taqavi, Mostafa
  7. Abstract:
  8. Nowadays, in philosophy of science, we are facing the “Value-laden Turn”. Indeed, many of the philosophers of science believe that the traditional view of science (which considers being value-free as a necessary condition for the objectivity of science, and according to this view, science should be free from non-epistemic values in the context of justification of scientific theories, and science is value-free as a matter of fact) is not defensible and justified. Instead, this group of philosophers of science (feminist philosophers of science are one of the most important representatives of this group) defends the idea that science is value-laden based on arguments and case studies showing how non-epistemic values affect the justification phase of scientific theories; Indeed, non-epistemic values play a significant role in evaluating and justifying scientific theories. If we acknowledge that science is value-laden, then we must address two important questions: 1) How exactly and in what ways do non-epistemic values affect the evaluation and justification of scientific theories? 2) How should we manage the impact of non-epistemic values in evaluating and justifying scientific theories so that the value-ladenness of science does not threaten the objectivity of science? In other words, is there an account of the objectivity of science based on which we can defend the objectivity of value-laden science under some certain conditions? In this thesis, we have addressed these two questions in four chapters. In the first and second chapters, by carefully examining the argument from inductive risk and underdetermination, we have shown in what ways non-epistemic values affect the justification phase of scientific theories. Then, in the second and third chapters, based on the theories of Longino and Bhaskar, we have explained under what conditions value-laden science can be objective. Finally, in the fourth chapter, we have benefited from the material of the first three chapters in order to better analyze the debate between Golshani and Stenmark about religious science. In the fourth chapter, we have shown that: firstly, according to the argument from inductive risk and underdetermination, value-laden science (in general) and religious value-laden science (in particular) are possible; Secondly, in order for religious value-laden science to be objective, it must meet certain conditions (we have explained the conditions of objectivity of value-laden science in chapters 2 and 3). The serious flaw in the work of some thinkers defending religious value-laden science is that they have not sufficiently addressed the problem of objectivity of religious value-laden science
  9. Keywords:
  10. Science and Value Relation ; Value Laden Technology ; Feminist Philosophy ; Religious Science ; Critical Realism ; Objectivism ; Argument from Inductive Risk ; Value-Free Science

 Digital Object List

 Bookmark

No TOC