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  3. بکارگیری الکترو کاتالیست های غیرپلاتینی جهت کاربرد در پیل های سوختی دما پایین
غربال‌گری و علامت‌دهی در سازمان‌های ناسودبر
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غربال‌گری و علامت‌دهی در سازمان‌های ناسودبر

فرح زا، کیان Farahza, Kian

Screening and Signaling in Nonprofit Organizations:Reconsidering the Samaritan’s Dilemma

Farahza, Kian | 2022

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  1. Type of Document: M.Sc. Thesis
  2. Language: Farsi
  3. Document No: 55261 (44)
  4. University: Sharif University of Technology
  5. Department: Management and Economics
  6. Advisor(s): Fatemi, Farshad; Dadgar, Yadollah
  7. Abstract:
  8. The debate on the efficient way of altruism is a long-lasting topic. Economists attempted to model the nonprofit problems with game theory. Buchanan’s Samaritan Dilemma (1975) is one of the early instances, followed mainly by institutionalist researchers. However, no analytical model unifies the credible commitment problems. This thesis investigates two misallocation problems: the recipient’s motivation to deviate resources from the donor’s aims, and the information asymmetry that invokes affluent people to imposter eligible recipients. We probe a specific case representing a subsistence economy. One philanthropist faces agents with identical preferences but heterogeneous wealth, not recognizing them on the capability spectrum. We design an incentive-efficient screening and signalling mechanism that lets her commit credibly and overcome information asymmetry. This institution includes delegating the decision of cash transfer and non-tradable investment. The screening cost is a function of its accuracy on the spectrum. However, to minimize this spending, the organization allows the recipients to signal their capital level and register for one and only one aid program. To prevent off-equilibrium signals, the organization plans to supply every aid program (cash transfer plus investment) equal to the number of people at the corresponding point of the primary wealth distribution. If the demand exceeds the supply, recipients are selected randomly. Therefore, risk-averse agents do not deviate from the intuitive criterion.
  9. Keywords:
  10. Mechanism Design ; Screening ; Decision under Asymmetric Information ; Samaritan’s Dilemma ; Social Sector ; Screening and Signalling ; Nonprofit Organization

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